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Abstract
The intensity of competition in contests is affected by the sum of the awarded prizes and by
the prize distribution among the contestants. The current paper examines which of these two
parameters has a larger effect on the players’ extent of participation in the contest.
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We are grateful to an anonyms referee for his constructive comments. 1. Introduction 
The intensity of competition in contests is affected by the sum of the awarded prizes  
and by the prize distribution between the contestants. It seems that the larger the sum 
of the prizes and the more symmetric its distribution, the more intense is the 
competition; that is, the larger the efforts incurred by the contestants. In this paper we 
study the general class of such two-player variable contests and examine their effect 
on the contestants’ efforts. 
  The efforts exerted in the contest deserve attention, first, because they can be 
interpreted as social costs and, second, because they can serve as a measure of an 
interest-group involvement in the contest.  Of course, ceteris paribus, when a player is 
more involved in the contest, he has a higher probability of winning.  In many cases it 
is in the public interest or in the interest of the ruling politicians to induce one of the 
participants in the contest to be more active, that is, be more involved in the contest. 
Typically, the provision of such an incentive is considered in the context of contests 
that arise when the government proposes some new  public policy, e.g., some new 
form or degree of monopoly regulation, (Ellingsen, 1991), a tax reform or a trade 
policy, and the contest outcome determines whether the proposed policy is approved 
or rejected (Epstein and Nitzan, 2002, 2005). 
Our results hinge on a fundamental equation that decomposes the total effect 
on individual effort into two sub-effects that correspond to the change in the two 
measures of intensity of competition. We show that the ‘prize-distribution effect’ is 
always larger than the ‘size effect’ (size of the sum of the prizes). The result states 
that when there is a change in both the size of the prizes and in their distribution, the 
direct incentives due to the change in the contestant’s relative share is larger than the 
indirect incentives due to the relative change in the sum of the contest prizes. In 
particular, a contest on part of the GNP is going to affect waste (lobbying efforts) 
more through the contestants’ direct distributional (inequality) incentives than through 
their indirect size (the size of the contested “cake”) incentives. 
 
2. The Variable Contest 
In our contest there are two players that compete for different (or equal prizes).  In 
general, one group may gain a higher benefit than the other from winning the contest.  
  1The players engage in a contest that determines the probabilities of winning or losing 
the contest.
1  
The total amount of prizes in the contest is denoted by V.  With probability 
  (i = 1,2)  player i wins the contest and gains  i Pr V i α , where  1 0 < < i α  and 
1 2 1 = +α α  . He loses the contest and gains no prize and gains no prize with 
probability  . Let x i j Pr 1 Pr − = i denote the effort of the risk-neutral player i. The 
expected net payoff of  i is given by:  
      
                                          () 2 , 1 Pr = ∀ − = i x V w E i i i i α     (1) 
 
Our primary concern is with question how do changes in the value of the total 
prize V  and in its distribution affects the effort exerted by the players. To analyze this 
problem, we consider an exogenous variable I that affects both the value of the total 
prize V and the share each of the players may gain,  i α .  Both  i α and V  thus depend 
on the value of the parameter I:  ( ) ) (I V and I i α . 
Given the contestants’ efforts, the probabilities of winning or losing the 
contest are obtained by the contest success function. As in Skaperdas (1992), it is 
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inequality ensures that the second order conditions are satisfied).  Since 
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1 Modeling the contestants as single agents presumes that they have already solved the collective action 
problem.  The model thus applies to already formed interest groups.  
2 The function Pri( ) is usually referred to as a contest success function (CSF). The functional 
forms of the CSF’s  commonly assumed in the literature, see Nitzan (1994) and Skaperdas (1996), 
satisfy these assumptions.  
j i x x ,
  2By our assumptions, both players participate in the contest (x1 and x2 are 
positive).  We therefore focus on interior Nash equilibria of the contest. Solving the 
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The first order conditions therefore require
3 that: 
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By the expressions in (4) that determine the equilibrium efforts of the players and 
their probabilities of winning the contest and by the assumed properties of the CSF, 
we directly obtain that under a symmetric contest success function
4 
( ), the player with the higher stake makes a larger 
effort and has a higher probability of winning the contest. The probability of the 
socially more efficient outcome of the contest is therefore higher than the probability 
of the less efficient outcome. For a similar result see Baik (1994) and Nti (1999).  
This type of efficiency criterion has been used by Ellingsen (1991), Fabella  (1995) 
and, more recently, by Hurley (1998). 
) , ( Pr ) , ( Pr   , , i j j j i i j i x x x x x x = ∀
 
3. Results             
Let us now consider the effect of changes in I  on the effort exerted by the players. 
These efforts deserve attention because they can be interpreted as social costs and 
because they represent each player’s involvement in the  contest that often becomes a 
direct target of the agent (usually the government) that controls I, the contest 
designer. In other words, when a player is more involved in the contest, his   
                                  
3 It can be easily  verified that the second order conditions  hold. 
4 Such symmetry implies that the two players share an equal ability to convert effort into probability of 
winning the contest. 
  3probability of winning the contest becomes higher, which might coincide with the 
interest of the contest designer. The selection of the functions  ( ) ) (I V and I i α , or the 
selection of  I when these functions are given might therefore be of considerable 
significance to the contest designer.  In many cases indeed it is in the public interest 
or in the interest of the ruling politicians to induce one of the contestants to be more 
involved in the public debate over issues such as monopoly regulation, some 
environmental policy, a tax reform or a new trade policy. Typically, the provision of 
such an incentive is considered in the context of contests on the approval or rejection 
of new policy proposals by the government.   
A change in I affects both the total amount of prizes in the contest V and the 
share each of the players gains if he wins the contest.  Notice that there are  four 











: a change in I that reduces (increases) the prize to be 

















 and redistributes benefits in 
favor of  player i (player j) which implies an increase (a decrease) in the share of the 
















.   
  The effort of a contestant is determined not only by the effect of I on V and  i α , 
but also by the ability of contestant j to convert effort into probability of winning the 
contest. This ability can be represented by the marginal effect of a change in his effort 
on his winning probability. By assumption, this marginal effect is declining with his 
own effort. A change in his effort also affects, however, the marginal winning 
probability of his opponent i. The opponent i has an advantage in terms of ability if a 
change in j’s effort positively affects his marginal winning probability.  In other 
words, a positive (negative) sign of the cross second-order partial derivative of   
Pr i( ,  ) , j i x x
i j
i




, implies that i has an advantage (disadvantage) when j’s effort 
changes. At some given combination of efforts (  the ratio between the effect 
of a change in j’s effort on the marginal winning probability of i and the effect of a 
j i





















, is therefore a local 
measure of the asymmetry between the abilities of i and j.   
By differentiation of the first order conditions (see (3)), we get that the Nash 
equilibrium efforts satisfy the following conditions: 
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Rewriting (5) together with (4), we obtain: 
 
(6)   
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V D α . 
 
In this equation one can clearly distinguish between the separate effects on i’s 
effort of a change in the relative size of the prize and of a change in the relative share 
of i’s stake. The change in the relative size of the prize is given by V’/V (see the first 
component in the RHS of the equation).  There may be many measures for the change 
in the share of i's stake. We consider the measure that takes into account both the 

















.  The former element by itself is inadequate, because it doesn't 





 may equal 10%, however, it is not 






, which means that  the 










 (see the second component in the RHS of the 
equation).   It is clear that the weight of the effect of the change in the relative size of 
the prize is smaller than the weight of the effect of the change in the relative share of 























































































































.  Hence, 
 
 
Proposition: The effect on i’s effort of a change in the prize distribution is always  
larger than the effect on  i’s  effort  of a change in the sum of the prizes. 
Moreover, if the effect of the a change in the sum of the prize is stronger than the 
effect of the change in the prize distribution, then the net effect of the change is 
negative.   
 
The proposition states that when there is a change in both the size of the prizes 
and in their distribution, the direct incentives corresponding to the change in the   
contestant’s relative share are larger  than the indirect incentives corresponding to the 
change in the contest prize.  On the other hand, if the effect of the relative share is 
  6weaker than the indirect incentives corresponding to the change in the contest prize, 
then the effect of the change in the size is negative.  In particular, if both weights are 
positive, then in case of a contest for part of the GNP, the waste (lobbying efforts) are 
affected more through the contestants’ direct distributional (relative inequality) 
incentives than through the indirect size (the size of the contested “cake”) incentives. 
To illustrate the implications of the proposition, consider the case where 
player i is the weak player, both in terms of the share he gains in case of winning the 










.  Now suppose that  the relative change in player  j’s  share  equals the 




















and that  both j’s share and the sum of the prizes are reduced, that is, 
0 ' < j α  ( ) 0 ' > j α  and  . In such a case player j reduces his effort. By applying 
(6), we obtain that  













x j .  That is,  although  player i  receives a 
higher share of the reduced aggregate prize in case of winning the contest,  he 
increases his effort.  The increased involvement of player i and the reduced 
involvement of player  j  increases  i’s chances of winning the contest.     
          To conclude, we have shown that in a general two-player contest, a change in 
the relative share of the aggregate prize has a larger effect on the effort invested by a  
contestant in comparison  to a change in the relative size of the aggregate prize.  A 
contestant’s behavior is always more sensitive to a change in intensity of competition 










 relative to a change in the intensity of competition as 
measured by V’/V  . 
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